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A Mark in Time Saves Nein
BRUCE BUENO DE MESQUITA AND A.F.K. ORGANSKI
ABSTRACT. A method for predicting political interactions and policy
outcomes based on two political theorems is presented and illustrated with
an examination of the decision to merge the two German currencies.
Political perceptions and actions are anticipated by combining the
substantive knowledge of area experts with the theoretical insights
embedded in the median voter theorem and a monotonicity theorem that
links expectations to probabilistic statements of action. The proposed model
has proven accurate about 90 percent of the time.
The proposed forecasting method identifies a sequential strategy that
may have been followed by Chancellor Kohl in forging the coalition needed
to merge successfully the two German currencies. Using comparative
statics, the analysis suggests how subtle and sophisticated Chancellor Kohl
had to be to succeed in getting the policy outcome he desired despite stiff
opposition.
It is apparent that 1990 will be remembered as the time of passage from the old to
the new Europe. The speedy, peaceful unification of Germany is perhaps the most
remarkable of the massive changes which began with the reversal of Soviet policy
toward the Western powers; the emergence of new, friendly relations with the United
States; and the liberation of Eastern Europe. Events of the past few years have
revolutionized the European political environment. The unification of Germany has
transformed power realities and the rules under which Germany and Europe will
operate in the foreseeable future. A united Germany appears well on the way to
becoming the dominant European country in all of Western Europe, and in parts of
Eastern Europe as well, making Germany the cornerstone of the new Western
European power structure and the new American interlocutor in Europe.
Two points should be made. First, it should be kept in mind that the West German
leadership echelons, with a great deal of popular support, have persisted for almost
all the time since World War II to assert the unity of the German nation (Dean,
1989; Schweigler, 1989). In a world in which unification appeared unrealizable, the
focus of West German strategy was on minimizing the severity of the division of
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Germany. Ironically, this goal was pursued with policies ranging from accommoda-
tion to the division of Germany (e.g., recognition of the GDR) at one end, to the
proffering of economic assistance to East Germany on the other.
That this relationship has affected the nature of both the GDR and the FRG should
be recognized. Both the FRG and the GDR were the richest and most important
members (other than the superpowers themselves) of the two economic and political
coalitions that, until quite recently, confronted one another (namely, Comecon and
the Warsaw Pact, NATO and the EEC). Their recovery from the ravages of World
War II were remarkable. West Germany surpassed France in the production of steel
in the early 1950s and competes as an exporter of manufactures with Japan. Both
the GDR and the FRG were important sources of manufactures for their allies not
only for civilian products but also for defense goods. True, East Germany lagged
substantially behind the West German state despite extensive economic aid received
through its special relationship with West Germany; however, this appears to have
been due, in large part, to economic mismanagement which disrupted the national
economy more severely than even the cruelest war.
A second impressive element of the situation in regard to the two Germanies was
the unbelievable stability in the fundamental socio-economic processes responsible
for the ongoing systemic change. Despite the prospective power explosion due to the
fusion of the two Germanys, unification has proceeded unimpeded by significant
elements within or outside either Germany. Despite the earthquakes that have shaken
the political and economic topography of Germany to its roots over the previous 50
years, the new Germany can be expected to be very roughly where it would have
been economically had no war occurred.
Although, as already noted, economic performance in East Germany has been
stifled, West Germany’s economic system is as strong or even stronger than it was
before the war. In 1936 the FRG portion of the Reich economic system produced
$26.8 billion (or 41 percent of the GNP of the United States, then about $64.7 billion);
in 1980 the same territory produced 32 percent of the value of the US domestic
product in the same year (Kaser, 1989). Furthermore, in 1937 West Germany
competed in exports with the United Kingdom, the leading exporter of manufactures
of the time; today, West Germany is locked in a close race with Japan, the leading
exporter of manufactures in our own epoch.
Those knowing German history may be reminded by today’s events of the rise of
Prussia as it brought under control the other German states. That takeover was to
be punctuated by the rapid, relatively bloodless, seven-week conflict between Prussia
and Austria, which the former won easily. It was a signal, and all of Europe knew
at the time that a system change had occurred and that the pecking order in Europe
had changed (Bueno de Mesquita, 1990b). Perhaps we are witnessing a new, peaceful
power transition in Europe (Organski and Kugler, 1980).
This paper addresses one fundamental issue regarding the process of German
unification today. It seeks to answer the question of who will pay the bill for the
anschluss of East Germany and the Federal Republic. There is and will continue to
be a substantial tug of war over the issue of costs. This is a central political and
economic question, and economic estimates suggest that West German absorption of
the GDR will be very costly. Thus the query as to how much it will cost and how
such costs will be distributed is of critical importance.
Related to it is the question of why the parties decide the issues the way they will.
The political dynamics should prove crucial, and it should be noted that the decision
over costs, though made by the Germans, is one in which actors in and out of the
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two Germanys can be expected to play a role. Moreover, the distribution of the
economic burden will result in political gains and losses to German leaders.
This paper addresses the outcomes and political dynamics that lead to the policy
choices that our analysis forecasts. The substantive focus of the analysis concerns the
conversion of East German marks into West German marks. Of equal importance,
however, is our interest in illustrating the application of formal modeling techniques
as a practical means of evaluating and predicting policy interactions. In this regard,
we focus here on the application of two theorems. Black’s (1958) median voter
theorem is adapted to predict policy outcomes. A theorem about the monotonicity
between certain expectations and the escalation of political disputes (Bueno de
Mesquita and Lalman, 1986; Banks, 1990) is used to make predictions about the
political ramifications of alternative proposals.
The Model
We present a general model for forecasting policy choices and the attendant pulls
and tugs that accompany political decisions. We begin with two commonly assumed
constraints that facilitate prediction and explanation: that issues are unidimensional
and that preferences (and associated utilities) for potential outcomes diminish
steadily the farther in Euclidean distance a possible outcome is from one’s most
preferred outcome or ideal point.
The two constraints - single-peaked utility functions and unidimensionality -
are necessary for the application of the median voter theorem. Black’s theorem, it
will be recalled, states that the ideal point of the median voter is the Condorcet
winner under the constraints we have assumed and with a simple majority required
for victory.’ Research on spatial models of voting following Black (e.g., Kramer,
1972; Davis, DeGroot, and Hinich, 1974; McKelvey, 1976; Schofield, 1976) shows
serious limitations in the applicability of Black’s theorem to multidimensional issues.
Nevertheless, enough issues appear to remain or collapse into a single dimension so
that unidimensionality and single-peakedness need not be viewed as so severe or so
simplifying as to render subsequent analysis trivial. In fact, the procedure for making
predictions outlined here has been applied to a very broad array of political, social,
military, and economic issues involving more than 60 countries. It has been
successfully applied to internal policy decisions in nations as diverse as India, Italy,
Iran, the Soviet Union, Mexico, China, Saudi Arabia, Canada, the Philippines and
the United States and it has also been applied to multilateral international
negotiations in such settings as the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
(OPEC), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the Association of
South East Asian Nations (ASEAN).
An approach that helps predict the most likely outcome in a policy debate surely
is of value, but it is inadequate for understanding the political dynamics that produce
a .settlement and that avoids or enhances the risks of conflict escalation. This latter
concern, however, is addressed by Banks’s (1990) theorem, which demonstrates that
the probability of confrontational escalation is an increasing function of the expected
utility from such a confrontation. As Banks notes with regard to an earlier version
of the model discussed here, &dquo;This justifies the assumption in the expected utility
models of Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman (1986) and Lalman (1988) that a decision
maker with a higher expected utility from war will be more likely to go to war; indeed
Lemma I shows this to be the only assumption consistent with rational behavior in
an incomplete information environment&dquo; (Banks, 1990: 605). Banks’s monotonicity
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theorem highlights an important feature of politics. It tells us that the more one
expects to gain from challenging a rival perspective, the more likely one is to
undertake the challenge.
Through the use of the monotonicity result and the median voter theorem we
suggest a simple model of perceptions and expectations that helps us comprehend
the environment within which bargaining takes place and that influences the dangers
of escalation. We capitalize on the perceptual features of the proposed model by using
comparative statics to describe the process by which negotiations unfold, moving
from one set of circumstances (and outcomes) to another and then another.
Predicting Policy Choices
When issues are unidimensional and preferences are single-peaked there must be a
Condorcet winner, an alternative that cannot be beaten by any other alternative in
a pairwise election process. Many, perhaps most, political choices, however, do not
involve elections in which each voter casts a single vote. Nevertheless, the median
voter theorem and Anthony Downs’s spatial theory of voting (1957) provide a
theoretical foundation from which we can gain assistance in predicting the resolution
of multilateral disputes.2 2
Let N = {I, 2, 3, ..., n) be the set of actors trying to influence a multilateral
negotiation. Let M = {I, 2, 3, ..., m) be the set of all issues discussed in a multilateral
negotiation and let Rm be the real number line segment, bounded for convenience
between 0 and 1, that describes the policy continuum for some issue m selected from
among the larger set of issues M. Let each actor i, iEN, have its own most preferred
resolution of issue m, XZ*(m), such that on Rm, 0 ~ Xt*(m) ~ 1. For any proposal
X(m)ER., i’s utility, U‘, for X(m) is a monotonically decreasin~ function of the
distance between X(m) and Xi*(m), so that UX(m) = fIX(m) - Xi (m)1 .3
Each actor i is assumed to be an expected utility maximizer, by which is meant
that i calculates the expected value of alternative strategies and pursues the one that
he or she believes is in his or her best interest. Of course, that belief may be incorrect.
Of the infinitely many possible proposals, X(m), to resolve issue m, how are we to
predict which will be chosen? To answer this question, let us first learn a little more
about each actor i. In this analysis, each actor is endowed with three characteristics.
Each actor attaches some utility to each possible outcome X(m) on issue m, as already
noted. Each participant in the negotiations is also endowed with the power to exert
some influence on decisions. Let C‘ be the capabilities of actor i, such that the sum
of the capabilities of the participants in a multilateral dispute is 1, so that C‘ is actor
i’s share of the total influence in the negotiations. Each participant has its own agenda
of priorities or salience that it attaches to the issues that must be confronted. Thus,
i may attach considerable importance to issue R1 and considerably less importance
to issue R2. Denote the salience of issue m for actor i as S’ (m). From the above
discussion, then, we see that each actor is described by three values [U X(m), C‘,
g(m)] on each issue.
The insights derived from the median voter theorem can be applied to almost any
political setting. Even in authoritarian regimes, the exercise of power may be
understood as a form of voting. When alternative courses of action are pitted against
each other, the array of forces on either side often determines victory. Of course, this
array depends on more than the relative power of the competing interests. It depends
also on the willingness to spend influence on the issue in question [s4(m)] - a budget
constraint - and the intensity with which each actor prefers one proposed settlement
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(e.g., [j X;(m), j’s proposal), to another ([j Xk(m), k’s proposal). Thus, each group
has a total number of potential &dquo;votes&dquo; equal to its capabilities, but discounts those
&dquo;votes&dquo; by its salience for the issue and by how much it prefers the particular options
under consideration. The &dquo;votes&dquo; cast by actor i in a comparison of alternatives X~(m)
and Xk(m) are said to equal Vi where:
The sum of &dquo;votes&dquo; across all actors in a comparison between §(m) and Xk(m) equals
Vk where
If Vk is greater than zero, then §(m) defeats Xk(m), indicating that the tacit coalition
in favor of j’s proposal X~(m) is more motivated and powerful than the coalition
supporting k’s proposal, Xk(m). If Vk is less than zero, X;(m) is defeated by Xk(m)
and if yk equals zero the competing interests are collectively indifferent between the
two alternatives.
In any negotiation, there are likely to be many more than two proposed
settlements. By pitting all alternatives against one another two at a time, the
Condorcet winner is found and is the predicted outcome (Black, 1958). In practice,
of course, it is impractical to compare an infinite number of alternatives. But, one
can set a sufficiently fine gradient on R,, to insure with a very high probability that
one has made a prediction that is sufficiently close to the precise contents of a
settlement as to be acceptably accurate.
Altering the Expected Outcome: Manipulating Perceptions
The forecasting element of the model reveals what decision-makers should expect if
everyone acts sincerely in accordance with their underlying preferences. What,
however, can a decision-maker do if the predicted outcome is not to his or her liking?
Is there anything that can be done to improve the expected outcome?
It is possible for actors to cooperate in private, sophisticated deals to rearrange
outcomes. The perceptual component of the model guides the analyst’s inquiries so
as to facilitate understanding which &dquo;deals&dquo; are feasible and which are not.4 If an
interest group is dissatisfied with the expected outcome, there are essentially four
courses of action by which this group - the focal group - might improve its
prospects. The group leadership can:
( 1 ) alter its own level of effort (i.e., change ,S~(m);
(2) shift its revealed position, selecting Xi(m) such that Uxi*(m) * lfXi(m);
(3) influence those who are willing to make concessions to the focal group so
that those other groups alter their level of effort (i.e., Sk(m)); or
(4) influence those who are willing to make concessions to the focal group so
that those other groups alter their revealed position Xk(m) so that UkXk*(m)
# ZIkXk(m).
Decision-makers interested in ascertaining what leverage they can exert could
benefit from estimating the beliefs held by each other actor. To do so requires a focus
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on the three characteristics - U X(m), St(m), Ca - used to estimate each player’s
expected utility from challenging or not challenging the policy outcome of each
potential rival and for approximating the expected utility each actor i believes its
rival expects to derive from challenging or not challenging the policy goals of i. In
the model envisioned here, decision makers are assumed to calculate the expected
consequences of challenging and of not challenging alternative proposals. The
expected utility for i from not challenging rival j’s position (E4VXj(m) given 4 is
estimated by projecting what the relevant decision maker believes is likely to happen
in the absence of the exertion of pressure on a rival to persuade the opponent to alter
its behavior. One of three contingencies may arise. First, i may anticipate that with
some probability ((~) rival j will not alter its current policies over the time period of
concern to i, and so i will derive whatever utility it receives from the preservation of
the status quo (SQ) between itself and j, that is ~L7~S~(m)]. Alternatively, i may
anticipate that j’s position on the issues will change, in which case there is some
chance (T) that, from i’s perspective, the policies of j are anticipated to get better
(with ~~(77!) being the associated utility) or to get worse (~W~(m)], so that UBj(m)
> U SQ, (m) > U W ,(m). i’s expected utility if it leaves j’s proposal unchallenged is:
When i contemplates challenging j, i presumably takes into account the probability
that j does not care enough about issue m to challenge any proposed settlement,
including i’s policy preference [(1-.9)( m)] or that j will resist i’s proposal, in which
case there is some likelihood that i will succeed in its efforts to enforce its wishes on
j, (P ), and some probability that it will fail. Should i succeed, then i will derive the
utility associated with convincing j to switch from its current policy stance to that
supported by i. This is denoted by LTS(m), with US(m) = Ilt[X2(m) - Xj(m)]. Should
i fail, then it confronts the prospect of having to abandon its objectives in favor of
those pursued by j, denoted by UF(m) = U[Ãj(m) - X2(m)]. The expected utility
for challenging j’s proposed resolution of the multilateral dispute (EVXj(m) given c)
is:
9J that the overall expected utility of i is:
If equation (5) is greater than zero, then i believes that challenging j’s position is
superior to not challenging. If (5) is less than zero, then not challenging is preferred
and i is said to be deterred. If (5) equals zero, then i is indifferent between
challenging and not challenging j’s proposed settlement. Since each actor evaluates
equation (5) vis-A-vis each other actor, and since the estimates of PZ include
calculations of how all other parties are expected to respond to a confrontation
between a given pair I and j, placing each other actor in i’s coalition, j’s coalition, or
in a neutral position, the estimation of a complete matrix of expected utilities should
capture all possible confrontations, negotiations, and capitulations among all the
participants in the relevant political arena.
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The terms in equation (5), with the exception of utility terms, are measured in
accordance with detailed procedures described by Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman
(1986).5 Utilities for specific proposals (e.g., X~(m)ERm), based on spatial data
depicting the location on Rm of each actor’s most preferred outcome (i.e., XZ*(m)),
are evaluated so that:
with ri estimated as in Bueno de Mesquita (1985) and Morrow (1987). Utilities for
the marginal gains [(VS(m) and ~7~(~)] or losses [UF(m) and UTtj(m)] from shifts
to alternative proposals are evaluated, using the basic building block just described,
in the manner delineated in Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman (1986). Equation (5)
is estimated from four perspectives, with relevant superscripts on equation (5)
indicating from whose perspective the calculation is being viewed:
( 1 ) i’s expected utility for its proposal vis-~-vis each rival;
(2) i’s perception of each j’s expected utility vis-a-vis i’s proposal;
(3) j’s expected utility for its proposal vis-a-vis each rival; and
(4) j’s perception of each i’s expected utility vis-a-vis j’s proposal.
The expected utility values summarized in (1) and (2) and in (3) and (4)
respectively describe each actor’s perception of its relationship vis-a-vis each other
actor. With Banks’s monotonicity of escalation theorem in mind, these relationships
can be described in continuous form. According to Banks’s theorem, the probability
with which an actor anticipates confronting a given rival increases monotonically
with its expected utility for challenging the rival’s proposal. Using this theorem, we
state the following expectations:
Pr(Confrontation) = Pi(Confrontational) X
PJ (Confrontational)
Pr(i Gains Concessions) = ~(Confrontational) X
P (Not Confrontational)
Pr(j Gains Concessions) = P’(Not Confrontational) X
P (Confron ta tional)
Pr(Status Quo) = P(Not Confrontational) X
P (Not Confrontational)
with Pi(Confrontational) = an increasing function of expression (5) calculated in
accordance with i’s expectations, while Pi (Confrontational) is an increasing function
of j’s estimation of its expected utilities. The specific functional relationship assumed
here is:
and
Of course, the specific functions are ad hoc, but they are consistent with the
monotonicity principle implied by Banks (1990) and Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman
(1986). By identifying the values of (6) and (7) for each pair of interested actors in
a multilateral setting we are able to evaluate all of the interactions that can arise
and, thereby, assess the likely conditions under which an issue might be settled. It
is important to recall that each pairwise relationship has already taken into account
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all third-party interactions through the calculation of the appropriately discounted
effort of each third party for each member of the pair under review.
The likelihood with which confrontation or concessions occur can be easily
displayed in a coordinate space. For ease of presentation, we divide such a space into
six sectors, with the boundary between each reflecting a fundamental turning point
in the probability functions. Figure 1 displays such a coordinate space, along with
relevant labels for each of the six sectors, reflecting the general likelihood of
alternative outcomes in accordance with Banks’s monotonicity theorem. Figures
equivalent to this are used throughout this study to summarize relationships among
competing interests.
Figure 1. Guide to Graphs.
The Process of Negotiations: Modeling Comparative Statics
In applying the model it often is of interest to ascertain how strategic maneuvers can
shift expected outcomes toward or away from particular results. To the extent that
decision makers behave as if they make the calculations described above, the
proposed model can be a useful tool, but first it must be sensitized to the strategic
efforts to manipulate outcomes that are at the heart of negotiations.
One available strategic modification for an interested party, as noted in the
previous section, is to alter its level of effort. Sometimes, by spending more resources
and carrying a bigger stick, a group is able to offset its political opposition. By doing
so, the group enhances its relative &dquo;votes,&dquo; shifting the expected outcome in the
direction it desires. Depending on the particular structure of interests and influence,
it is also possible for increased effort to facilitate the formation of a counter-coalition,
thereby diminishing the prospects of moving the political settlement in the desired
direction. The model presented here allows one to simulate the effects of shifts in level
of effort so as to identify the optimal resource expenditure. Furthermore, the model
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reveals cases in which no change in level of effort by the interested group will
appreciably affect the predicted outcome. In such cases, other strategies, alone or in
combination with this one, may be necessary.
Shifts in policy stances are commonplace during negotiations. Indeed, in some
sense this is the essence of bargaining. As interested parties move to more moderate
or more extreme positions, they alter the level of support or opposition to their
position as they signal others about their flexibility on the issue being negotiated.
Sometimes, by moderating a position, a group is able to attract support from
significant actors who previously had been in the opposition. Other times, however,
moderation fosters outcomes supported by extremists. This can be accomplished by
breaking away marginal elements from an opposed coalition, pivoting just enough
power in a polarized situation to force a sharp swing toward the opposite extreme
and, thereby, maximizing the interested party’s expected utility.
It is also true that moves away from moderation and toward more extreme
positions can shift outcomes toward the center or away from the center depending
upon the particular structure of interests in the political setting. Since that setting is
defined by the structure of preferences, capabilities, and salience within the model
proposed here, the precise effects of a shift in position can be ascertained through
simulation, by moving group positions on the issue continuum utilized by the model
and then solving the model under these altered assumptions. Perhaps, such
simulations of alternative scenarios can even help forestall the implementation of
some sophisticated strategies that backfire in actual practice.
When a single group is unable through its own actions to alter appreciably the
expected outcome of a negotiation in the direction it desires, then it may consider
the possibility of coordinating with other groups. Obviously, this is more difficult
and hence more costly than moves that can be implemented unilaterally. When
coalition building is dictated, the model can be especially helpful in providing useful
guidance. The perceptual analysis, for instance, reveals which groups believe that they
should compromise or grant concessions to which particular other groups, through
the evaluation of beliefs about the probability that a given rival is inclined to be
confrontational or not. Thus, using the perceptual analysis, any interested group (or
an interested analyst) can identify the candidates for strategic encounters. A group
leader should, for instance, be most inclined to pressure those who believe they must
grant concessions to the group’s demands. The larger the probability that a rival will
not be confrontational, the lower the costs expected to be associated with extracting
gains from the foe, thereby making such an actor an especially attractive candidate
for influence attempts. By focusing efforts on groups believed to have a high
probability of granting concessions, the interested party can most efficiently organize
the coalition - with altered levels of effort and/or revealed policy preferences - that
will shift the outcome to be most in line with the organizing group’s preferences.
Again, simulation facilitates evaluating the impact of alternative coalitions so that the
one actually constructed yields the best possible outcome at the lowest political cost.
The techniques just described allow the analyst to use comparative statics to
evaluate the impact of alternative strategies. This can be done from the perspective
of any interest group or of all groups. What is more, the process can proceed in stages,
first identifying the best strategic reaction to the initial, base case, circumstance; then
analyzing strategic responses to the initial strategy to alter the base case and so forth.
In this way, a &dquo;movie&dquo; of the unfolding process of negotiations, of moves and counter-
moves, can be constructed.’ If a dominant strategy exists it is likely to be discovered
through this iterative process.
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German Monetary Integration7
With the model now delineated, we turn to the politics underlying the integration of
the East German mark into the West German economy. It is clear that there are
important tensions between the political desire for a smooth transition from two
Germanys to one and the widespread interest in ensuring economic stability. Of
course, economic stability means quite different things for East Germans, West
Germans, other Europeans and the rest of the world economy.
The West German mark is a broadly traded, highly valued currency. The East
German mark does not share those characteristics. Consequently, East Germans
legitimately fear that economic union could mean that their pensions and savings are
at risk of becoming much less valuable. West Germans are legitimately concerned
that a generous monetary conversion will precipitate runaway inflation and a severe
setback for their economy’s competitiveness.
For many Europeans, the unification of the two Germanys is creating a new
economic hegemony on the continent. It is not surprising that many members of the
European community have expressed reservations regarding German unification. As
is evident from our analyses, the European community appears to be amenable to
an economic agreement that risks creating significant inflation and economic
disruption for Germany. Thus, between the conservative views of German bankers
and the unbridled desire to avoid any short-term economic costs for union expressed
by the Greens and the East German communists there is a wide gulf. Monetary
Table 1.
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conversion clearly is a potentially explosive issue. It is the question on which we
focus.
Data on group capabilities, preferences, and salience were collected on 13 April,
1990 from Professor Donald Hancock. The data are summarized in Table 1. The
issue analyzed here concerns the quantity of private savings that will be convertible
at a 1:1 ratio of East German marks to West German marks. The data for this study,
in conjunction with the two relevant theorems, provide an interesting perspective on
the bargaining process that may have produced the now announced and completed
agreement to convert up to 4000 marks per person to West German marks at a 1:1 I
ratio. As will be evident from our analysis, it appears that this agreement was the
product of a sequence of subtle maneuvers by the CDU in each of the two Germanys.
Our explanation of the outcome - found to be surprising by most Germany-watchers
when it was announced - appears to be consistent with the observed facts. Our
explanation also proposes details about the sequence of negotiations which eventually
can be evaluated against the discovery of the actual facts surrounding the settlement.
At first blush the data in Table I suggest that the monetary integration of the two
Germanys is less controversial than generally believed. Although it is true that most
East German interests favor a 1:1 conversion on at least 5000 marks of private savings
while the bulk of the West German interests want only to offer a l:l conversion rate
for up to 2000 marks of personal savings, still the overwhelming majority of potential
power is apparently opposed to accommodating East German wishes. As Figure 2
reveals, about 70 percent of the potential power and 60 percent of the resources
utilized on this issue are coalesced behind a l:1 conversion of only 2000 marks. It is
evident that the base prediction using the median voter outcome ought to have been
substantially less than the 4000 mark conversion agreement. How can we explain the
apparent discrepancy between the distribution of power and interests, on the one
hand, and the outcome on the other?
Figure 2. Base Case: Power and Preferences Regarding Mark Conversion.
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The model proposed here draws attention to perceptions as a fundamental aspect of
decision making. The case of the union of the two German currencies provides a
potent illustration of how beliefs can defeat an outcome that seemingly possesses
overwhelming support. Figure 3a depicts Chancellor Kohl’s expectations vis-~-vis
each of the other groups trying to influence the resolution of this issue, while Figure
3b depicts the estimated beliefs of each other group regarding its relationship with
Chancellor Kohl’s CDU. Figure 3c is the joint effect of the interaction of those two
sets of perceptions or what we call &dquo;reality&dquo;.
Of particular interest is the observation that Kohl apparently believed that the
Greens in West Germany, the PDS (formerly the Communist Party) in East
Germany, the Soviets, the United States, and the European Community would all
give in to his wishes on this issue. Figure 3b shows that Kohl apparently was correct
in thinking that the United States and the European community were inclined to
abandon their preference for a 2000 mark conversion arrangement and support
Kohl’s proposal of 4000 marks. The USSR, on the other hand, is not prepared to
capitulate to Kohl’s wishes, and is, according to our analysis, not prepared to make
concessions to Kohl. We do find, however, that the Soviets were willing to acquiesce
to the wishes of the East German CDU in favor of a 5000 mark conversion. Kohl’s
beliefs about the Greens and the PDS apparently are not correct. The model indicates
that they believed Kohl’s desires could be blocked and, as implied by Figure 3c, they
were unlikely to go along with Kohl’s desires.
Figure 3b suggests a comparative static analysis in which the United States and
the European Community move from 2000 marks on the issue continuum to 4000
marks, in keeping with the analytic result that suggests they would capitulate to
Chancellor Kohl on this aspect of economic union. The analysis (from the perspective
Figure 3a: Kohl’s Expectations, Base Case.
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Figure 3b: Expectations vis-h-vis Kohl: Others’ Views.
Figure 3c: Base Case Expectations, &dquo;Reality&dquo; View.
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Figure 4. Power and Preferences Regarding Mark Conversion. Kohl’s First Move:
Shift International Actors.
of the Soviets vis-A-vis the East German CDU) also supports the expectation that
the position of the Soviets would shift from 1:1 conversion of all savings to the East
German CDU position of 5000 marks, representing their willingness to compromise
on their initial demand. Having instituted this comparative static simulation, we find
that overwhelming power still supports an outcome of 2000 marks convertible at 1:1.
Figure 4 shows the new power distribution. Figures 5a, b, and c replicate the analysis
done earlier, but now we inquire into the perceived relations between Chancellor
Kohl and all others under the comparative static simulation that places the United
States and the European Community at 4000 marks and the USSR at 5000 marks.
The second comparative static analysis - dictated by the analytic results derived
from the first solution of the perceptual model - reveals that a new set of actors
would now be willing to make concessions to the CDU, given the initial moves by
the United States, Europe, and the USSR. With mounting support for Kohl’s 4000
mark proposal, the Greens and the East German communists now appear ready to
abandon their support for unlimited conversion and to join the East German CDU
and the Soviet Union in accepting the conversion of up to 5000 mark on a one-to-
one basis. This preparedness to compromise with Kohl can be seen in Figure 5b.
Movement by the Greens and other extreme interests does not alter appreciably
the distribution of utilized or potential power, nor does it alter the anticipated
outcome. However, the anticipated concessions of these groups fundamentally alter the
hardline stance of the West German banks and business interests.
We evaluate the expected impact of the concessions from the Greens and the
communists through another comparative statics analysis. Figure 6 shows the
distribution of power by preferred outcome if the Greens and the PDS pursued the
course of action indicated in Figure 5. Figure 7 shows the impact that their
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Figure 5a: Comparative Static 1: Kohl’s Expectations.
Figure 5b: Comparative Static 1: Others’ Expectations.
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Figure 5c: Comparative Static 1: &dquo;Reality&dquo; View.
concessions have on the perceptions of the banks and other groups vis-~-vis the West
German and the East German CDU.
Apparently, once the extreme left accepts the posture of the CDU, those endorsing
a conversion of only 2000 marks at a 1:1 rate are no longer able to sustain their
position. Perhaps fearing that their tough stance will jeopardize economic union and
will foment a resurgence of extreme leftist interests, the banks and others give in. The
model shows that they will accept as much as the conversion of 5000 marks - the
position of the East German CDU - despite their predominant power and ability
to have enforced a 2000 mark settlement. The forecast outcome in the model indicates
a generous settlement largely along the lines initially favored by Chancellor Kohl.
The prediction is for an agreement to convert between 4000 and 5000 marks at a
one-to-one rate. Figure 8 depicts the changing power distribution from the initial,
base case, through each of the comparative static analyses dictated by the model.
The final image shows that the majority of power should have been expected
gradually to shift to support for a generous settlement for the East Germans.
Of greatest interest in this analysis is the observation that Chancellor Kohl has
apparently taken a circumstance in which there was overwhelming support for a
harsh agreement and, ad seriatim, persuaded opponents to abandon their position in
support of the outcome he favored. He has done this despite the existence of stiff
opposition to his proposal at the outset. According to our evaluation, the key to
Chancellor Kohl’s success is the risk aversion of those who supported a 2000 mark
settlement. Despite their overwhelming strength, these groups were defeated by their
own fears of the political fallout from a hardline stance. Yet such fallout was unlikely
according to the modeling results developed here. The fear that the East Germans
would veto a 2000 mark settlement and Kohl’s ability to exploit that concern is at
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Figure 6. Power and Preferences Regarding Mark Conversion. Kohl’s Second Move:
Shift Greens and Communist.
Figure 7. Comparatirre ,Static 2: The Banks Capitulate.
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Figure 8. Kohl’s Strategy: Conversion of Marks.
the heart of the 4000 mark settlement. And yet our results also show that such
concerns were not warranted. The East should have been willing to bluffand posture,
but our investigation does not support the belief that they would have walked away
from economic union if they had only gotten an agreement to convert 2000 marks on
a one-to-one basis.
Conclusion
We have delineated a model for forecasting policy outcomes and political perceptions.
The model has been applied to the economic integration of the two Germanys. It
shows that through a series of subtle political maneuvers it was possible for
Chancellor Kohl to defeat those who wished to impose a harsh (perhaps realistically
harsh) economic arrangement on the East Germans. Kohl was able to do so despite
the fact that nearly 70 percent of all the potential political influence focused on this
question was initially controlled by those who wanted an exchange of 2000 marks
only on a l:l basis. Perceptions proved to be the key. At each step along the path to
an agreement, Kohl apparently capitalized on the beliefs of his opponents that they
needed to make concessions to his wishes. Through the application of a model of
rational expectations we have seen how beliefs and perceptions could be exploited to
structure a settlement that deviates markedly from the initial median voter outcome.
Notes
1. A Condorcet winner is any alternative that in head to head competition defeats each other
alternative.
2. For applications to settings that do not involve conventional voting see Bueno de Mesquita,
1984, 1990a; Bueno de Mesquita, Newman, and Rabushka, 1985; Morrow, 1986; Morgan,
1984, 1989, and 1990.
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3. Later we suggest an estimation procedure for specifying the function.
4. The model here is not game theoretic. It does, however, contain a rational expectations
component that looks at anticipated courses of action in the event a group does not
challenge a policy proposal. Decision theoretic models with such components tend to
converge on game theoretic equilibria. See Marcet and Sargent, November 1987, December
1987.
5. The measurement of the probability of success for i’s preferred outcome in a competition
with j’s preferred outcome is accomplished using the following specification:
with "p" denoting preference and with utilities (U terms) and salience (S terms) in Vk
defined as described in Bueno de Mesquita, Newman, and Rabushka (1985).
6. For a detailed example (drawn from Italian politics) of such an application of the model,
see Beck and Bueno de Mesquita, 1985.
7. The data for this study were collected in April 1990 and the analysis was completed in the
same month, before the announcement of the actual agreement by which the currencies
were merged. Consequently, we continue to use language implying a future event although
at the time of publication, of course, the issue has long been settled.
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